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ARTICLE UPDATE
SIXTH UPDATE TO COLORADO WATER LAW: AN
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
THE HONORABLE GREGORYJ. HOBBS, JR.,
To provide our readers with the most up-to-date water law
information, the editors periodically include updates of works
previously published in the Water Law Review. The following is the
sixth update to Colorado Water Law.- An Historical Overview,
Appendix-Colorado Water Law A Synopsis of Statutes and Case Law,'
selected by the Honorable GregoryJ. Hobbs, Jr.
In re Tonko
"The remedies and procedures in a district court right-of-way
condemnation proceeding are substantially different from those of a
water court application proceeding. The condemnation action involves
issues such as necessity and valuation in determining the compensation
award for a ditch or pipeline right-of-way needed for water transport in
the exercise of a water right. The prerequisite for maintaining the
condemnation action, pursuant to section 7 of article XVI of the
Colorado Constitution and section 37-86-104(1), C.R.S. (2006), is an
adjudicated conditional or absolute water right, but the adjudication of
such a right is not within the district court's jurisdiction. Adjudication
of water use rights belongs to the water court.
The water court process involves a division engineer's consultation
report, a referee's investigation, discovery, and a trial regarding
contested issues of fact involving claimed water use rights. A water
court applicant has incentives and the opportunity to try water use
questions that a condemnation proceeding lacks.
The existence or non-existence of the Tonkos' water use rights by
reason of the 1908 decree and coterminous conveyance by Picco and
Milano to Delisa of a 2/7ths interest in the Tatman Ditch water rights is
not identical to the condemnation of a ditch right-of-way issues the
district court had before it. The Tonkos' immediate predecessors-in1. Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado Water Law: An Historical Overview, 1 U. DENV.
WATER L. REv. 1, 27 (1997). The first update to Justice Hobbs' article appears at 2 U. DENY.
WATER L. REV. 223 (1999); the second update is at 4 U. DENY. WATER L. REv. 111 (2000);
the third update is at 6 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 116 (2002); the fourth update is at 8 U.
DENV. WATER L. REv. 213 (2004); and the fifth update is at 10 U. DENY. WATER L. REV. 391
(2007).
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interest did not have the same incentive or opportunity to litigate water
use matters in the condemnation proceeding as they are provided by
statute in the water court.
We conclude that the Tonkos' predecessors-in-interest did not have
a full and fair opportunity to litigate their water use rights in the
condemnation action. The fourth element of issue preclusion is not
satisfied.
The Tonkos argue that irrigation of their land is within the 1908
decree and that an undecreed invalid enlargement has not occurred in
regard to the Delisa interest in the Tatman Ditch water rights. The
Tonkos have asserted facts in support of this contention that are
properly triable in the water court, not the district court.
Whether Mallow lawfully extinguished the Delisa Ditch right-of-way
across his land and whether the Tonkos proceed with a condemnation
action turn on the outcome of their change of water rights application.
Because the Tonkos' application to confirm their water use rights
comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the water court, it must be
allowed to proceed."
In re Tonko, 154 P.3d 397, 407 (Colo. 2007) (case citations omitted).

Fort Lyon Canal Company v. High Plains A&M, LLC
"We have previously treated the bylaws of a mutual ditch company,
like the bylaws of other corporations, as provisions of a contract
between the corporation and its stockholders, and we have enforced
them as such, as long as a bylaw purporting to further condition or limit
the right to change a water right can be given effect consistent with
allowing full scope to the jurisdiction of the water court. Whether or
not a contract between a mutual ditch company and its stockholders,
requiring stockholders to bear the company's legal expenses for
opposing their application for a change of water right, without regard
to the merits of the application or the opposition to it, would be
consistent with the court's statutory discretion to award attorney fees,
the provisions of Fort Lyon's bylaws in this case simply do not purport
to impose any such burden.
Fort Lyon Canal Company v. High Plains A&M, LLC, 167 P.3d 726, 727-28 (Colo.
2007) (case citations omitted).

'"The bylaw refers to a determination by the board whether, and
under what circumstances, a requested change may be made without
causing injury. It separately refers to proceedings in the water court to
obtain a final decree or to challenge the board's determination as
arbitrary or capricious. There can be no doubt that the language of the
bylaw expressly refers to the board's required determination as "such
determination," and it expressly juxtaposes "such determination" and
subsequent proceedings challenging its validity "in a court of law having
jurisdiction over water matters." Equally clearly, this provision of the
bylaws imposes an obligation on the requesting stockholder only for
expenses incurred by the board of directors in making "such
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determination," and not for additional expenses incurred by the board
should it choose to participate in subsequent water court
proceedings... A contract must be construed to ascertain and
effectuate the intent of the parties, as expressed in the contract itself."
Id. at 728 (case citations omitted).

"Fort Lyon argues that the context and circumstances surrounding
the adoption of the provision in question demonstrate that it was
intended to insulate the company from all expenses associated with a
stockholder's application for a change of water right, including the
expense of defending the interests of the company's remaining
stockholders in proceedings before the water court. Even if that were
the case, however, such an intent is not reflected in the unambiguous
language of the bylaw. Regardless of the expectations of the drafters of
this bylaw or those who voted to adopt it, nothing in the provision itself
can reasonably be interpreted to impose an obligation on stockholders
to cover any expense beyond that of the "legal and/or engineering
services" required by the board in evaluating their written request."
Id. at 729.

Pagosa Area Water and Sanitation District v. Trout Unlimited
'We hold that a governmental water supply agency has the burden
of demonstrating three elements in regard to its intent to make a nonspeculative conditional appropriation of unappropriated water: (1)
what is a reasonable water supply planning period; (2) what are the
substantiated population projections based on a normal rate of growth
for that period; and (3) what amount of available unappropriated water
is reasonably necessary to serve the reasonably anticipated needs of the
governmental agency for the planning period, above its current water
supply. In addition, it must show under the "can and will" test that it
can and will put the conditionally appropriated water to beneficial use
within a reasonable period of time."
Pagosa Area Water and Sanitation District v. Trout Unlimited, 170 P.3d 307, 309-10
(Colo. 2007).

"As we explained in Bijou, the statute excuses governmental
agencies from the requirement to have a legally vested interest in the
lands or facilities served, but the exception 'does not completely
immunize municipal applicants from speculation challenges.' A
governmental agency need not be certain of its future water needs; it
may conditionally appropriate water to satisfy a projected normal
increase in population within a reasonable planning period
The governmental agency does not have carte blanche to
appropriate water for speculative purposes; in effect, the statute
provides for a limited exception from certain requirements otherwise
Public agencies must still
applicable to private appropriators.
substantiate a non-speculative intent to appropriate unappropriated
water, and they must 'have a specific plan and intent to divert, store, or
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otherwise capture, possess, and control a specific quantity of water for
§ 37-92-103(3) (a) (II).
Accordingly, the
specific beneficial uses.'
governmental agency has the burden to demonstrate that its
conditional appropriation is not speculative.
The conditional appropriation must be consistent with the
governmental agency's reasonably anticipated water requirements
based on substantiated projections of future growth within its service
area.
Only a reasonable planning period for the conditional
appropriation is allowed. In Bijou, the water court's findings of fact
addressed what constitutes a reasonable water supply planning period,
fifty years in that case, and found the existence of substantiated
population and water use projections. The judgment and decree we
upheld also included sufficient 'reality checks' for the purpose of
ensuring in subsequent diligence proceedings that the appropriator will
utilize the 'newly appropriated rights for its own purposes and does not
become a permanent lessor or wholesaler of water yielded by these
rights.'
We also determined in Bijou that use of a volumetric limitation in a
conditional decree, rather than a flow rate standard, curbs the
otherwise speculative tendency of a lengthy conditional appropriation
period.
Requiring adjusted, realistic estimates of future need in subsequent
diligence proceedings is consistent with the purpose underlying both
the anti-speculation doctrine and the diligence requirement, i.e.,
preserving unappropriated water for future users having legitimate,
documented needs.
The anti-speculation and the 'can and will' requirements are closely
related. A conditional decree applicant cannot reasonably prove that its
project can and will be completed with diligence and within a
reasonable time if it lacks the requisite non-speculative intent.
The factors a court considers under the 'can and will' requirement
in diligence proceedings include, but are not limited to: 1) economic
feasibility; 2) status of requisite permit applications and other required
governmental approvals; 3) expenditures made to develop the
appropriation; 4) ongoing conduct of engineering and environmental
studies; 5) design and construction of facilities; and 6) nature and
extent of land holdings and contracts demonstrating the water demand
and beneficial uses which the conditional right is to serve when
perfected. The purpose of the diligence proceeding is to gauge
whether the conditional appropriator is making steady progress in
putting the water to beneficial use with diligence and wiihin a
reasonable period of time.
The reason for continued scrutiny of the conditional appropriation
through diligence proceedings is to prevent the hoarding of priorities
to the detriment of those seeking to use the water beneficially. The
effect of a long-term conditional right is to preclude other
appropriators from securing an antedated priority that will justify their
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investment.
Those in line behind a conditional appropriation for a long
planning period risk losing any investment they may make in the hope
that the prior conditional appropriation will fail. They also may not be
able to raise the necessary funds in the first instance that will enable
them to proceed, in light of their subordinated status. Those who
obtain a priority date junior to the antedated priority and proceed to
put the water to beneficial use must involve themselves in a continued
expensive struggle throughout numerous six year diligence periods to
knock out all or part of the antedated conditional appropriation, in
order to protect their appropriations. The General Assembly's intent is
to prevent decreed conditional appropriations from accumulating to
the detriment of those whose priority will be advanced by cancellation
of the senior conditional priority in whole or part, or those who might
proceed to initiate a new or enlarged appropriation.
Thus, in the design of water law, the essential function of the water
court in a conditional decree proceeding is to determine the amount of
available water for which the applicant has established both a need and
a future intent and ability to actually use. As a prerequisite, the
applicant has the burden of demonstrating a nonspeculative intent to
put the water to beneficial use and, under the 'can and will' test, a
substantial probability that its intended appropriation will reach
fruition."
Id. at 315-17.

"Based on Colorado's statutory requirements and Bijou, the limited
governmental agency exception to the anti-speculation doctrine should
be construed narrowly, in order to meet the state's maximum utilization
and optimum beneficial use goals. Although the fifty year planning
period we approved in Bijou is not a fixed upper limit, and each case
depends on its own facts, the water court should closely scrutinize a
governmental agency's claim for a planning period that exceeds fifty
years.
The ultimate factual and legal issue in a governmental agency
conditional appropriation case involves how much water should be
conditionally decreed to the applicant. The experts who testified at the
water court trial in this case were called upon to address such pertinent
factors as: (1) implementation of reasonable water conservation
measures for the planning period; (2) reasonably expected land use
mixes during that period; (3) reasonably attainable per capita usage
projections for indoor and outdoor use based on the land use mixes for
that period; and (4) the amount of consumptive use reasonably
necessary for use through the conditional appropriation to serve the
increased population."
Id. at 317-18 (cases citations and statutory quotations omitted).
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Buffalo Park Development Company v. Mountain Mutual
Reservoir Company
"Any person or organization may maintain a statement of
opposition for the purpose of holding the applicant for a conditional
water right to a standard of strict proof. In addition, ground water
appropriators for small capacity domestic water wells hold vested water
rights pursuant to section 37-92-602(3)(II) (A), C.R.S. (2008). These
vested water rights are entitled to protection when new conditional
water rights or augmentation plans are proposed, independent of
whether their owners adjudicate the water rights.
In an effort to protect small agricultural and domestic water users,
the General Assembly has created a statutory category for exempt small
capacity ground water rights that differ from all other water rights.
When issuing permits for small capacity ground water wells for domestic
use under section 37-92-602(3) (II) (A), C.RS. (2008), where the return
flow from the single family residential household use is returned to the
same stream system in which the well, is located, the State Engineer is
entitled to presume that this use will not materially injure the vested
water rights of others. However, pursuant to section 37-92-602(3) (b)
(III), C.R.S. (2008), this presumption does not apply to subdivision
ground water appropriations proposed afterJune 1, 1972.
Thus, the owners of small capacity ground water wells hold vested
ground water rights, obtained when they complete their wells and put
the ground water to beneficial use. They are exempt from having to
apply to the water court for recognition of their water rights and from
priority administration by the water officials. Yet, they are entitled to
protection of their water rights when new conditional ground water
uses or augmentation plans are proposed pursuant to the 1969 Act and
the well permit provisions of the Groundwater Management Act.
Section 37-90-137(2)(b)(I), C.R.S. (2008), provides that the State
Engineer must make four findings before granting a permit application
to construct a well: (1) there-is-unappropriatedwater ayailable, (2) the
vested water rights of others will not be materially injured, (3)
hydrological and geological facts substantiate the proposed well, and
(4) the proposed well will be located over 600 feet from any other
existing wells. (Emphasis added). Otherwise, the State Engineer must
deny the well permit application.Pursuant to section 37-92-305(6) (a),
C.RIS. (2008), the water court must accord presumptive validity to the
State Engineer's well permit findings.
In lieu of applying for a well permit first, an applicant may elect to
file a conditional water right application and/or an augmentation plan
application directly with the water court. As the State Engineer must
determine whether there is unappropriated water available to. supply
the proposed new ground water diversion, so must the water court.
Pursuant to section 37-92-305(9) (b), C.R.S. (2008), the water court
determines whether the applicant claiming the availability of
unappropriated water has proved at trial that there is unappropriated
water available for appropriation. If not, the court determines pursuant
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to section 37-92-305(3),(5) &(8), C.RS. (2008), whether the applicant
has proposed and proved an adequate augmentation plan the
operation of which, in accordance with the water court's decree
including protective terms and conditions, will prevent material injury
to vested water rights or decreed conditional water rights.
In cases where a statement of opposition has been filed to an
applicant's augmentation plan, the applicant must provide the water
court a proposed ruling or decree to prevent injurious effect to a vested
water right or a decreed conditional water right prior to any hearing on
the merits of the application. § 37-92-305 (3), C.RS. (2008).
The owner of a vested small capacity ground water right may contest
the adequacy of a proposed subdivision well augmentation plan
through a statement of opposition in the case, and file for adjudication
of his or her in-house residential ground water right's antedated
priority date."
Buffalo Park Development Company v. Mountain Mutual Reservoir Company, 195 P.3d
674, 686-87 (Colo. 2008) (case citations omitted).

"Buffalo Park's augmentation plan proposal centered on protecting
surface water users. It proposed no augmentation water to protect the
vested ground water rights in the vicinity of the Mountain Park Homes
and Bear Mountain Vista subdivisions. Its plan for the Cragmont
subdivision was based on precipitation and septic return flows being
sufficient to replace depletions to the existing wells. It made no
evidentiary showing about the timing and amount of depletions and the
sufficiency of legally available replacement water, in time and amount,
to alleviate injury to the vested ground water rights of the existing well
owners in the face of evidence that precipitation infiltrating into the
aquifer could not be intercepted without causing injury to existing
rights.
Thus, Buffalo Park's evidence did not meet the legal standards for a
non-injurious augmentation plan in connection with proposed new
ground water diversions, set forth in City of AroraexreLUtiLEnter.
In contrast, the opposers produced evidence, summarized in part I of
this opinion, that the proposed wells for these three subdivisions would
materially injure the vested ground water rights of existing home
owners.
Although section 37-92-305(3), C.R.S. (2008), allows an
applicant to propose terms and conditions for an augmentation plan
decree necessary to protect against injury to existing vested water rights
and conditional water rights, this provision assumes that the applicant
bears its burden of proving the amount and timing of depletions from
its proposed new diversions and the amount and timing of replacement
water from legally available sources to remedy the injurious impact of
those depletions upon pre-existing vested rights. This proof cannot be
postponed for determination later under retained jurisdiction."
Id. at 690.
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Simpson v. Cotton Creek Circles, LLC.
"This is an appeal from a water court's Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree ('judgment") upholding
rules related to certain new withdrawals from the confined aquifer in
Water Division Three ("the rules"). Appellant Cotton Creek Circles,
LLC ("Opponent") asserts that the rules are invalid because they are
contrary to statute and violate the Colorado Constitution. We disagree,
and we affirm the water court's judgment upholding the rules."
Simpson v. Cotton Creek Circles, LLC., 181 P.3d 252,254 (Colo. 2008).

'Weaffirm the water court's findings of fact 'unless they are so
clearly erroneous as to find no support in the record.' However, we
review the water court's legal conclusions de novo.
Some of Opponent's arguments implicate the wisdom of the rules.
In general, water law regulations are presumed to be valid until shown
otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence. However, while courts
defer to policy determinations in rule-making proceedings, that
deference 'does not extend to questions of law such as the extent to
which rules and regulations are supported by statutory authority.' In
addition, Opponent makes several challenges to the constitutionality of
parts of HB 98-1011 and SB 04-222. 'Statutes enacted by the General
Assembly are presumed constitutional and a party asserting that a
particular statute violates constitutional provisions assumes the burden
of establishing such assertion beyond a reasonable doubt.'
Id. at 260-61 (case citations omitted).

A. Artesian Pressure Provisions Are Valid
Opponent argues that the artesian pressure provisions in SB 04-222
and the rules are invalid. Because the artesian pressure requirements in
the rules merely follow the legislative mandate, this is best described as
an argument against the validity of the statute itself.
According to Opponent, the artesian pressure requirements violate
the right to appropriate by "locking up unappropriated water." Before
we turn to this argument, we first explain the appropriation doctrine as
it applies in this case. There is no right to divert additional water from
the confined aquifer, unless there is unappropriated water available and
that withdrawal will not materially injure the vested rights of others. See
§ 37-90-137 (2) (b) (I) (providing that the state engineer may not issue a
permit to construct a well unless he or she finds that unappropriated
water is available for withdrawal and that the vested rights of others will
not be materially injured). Therefore, Opponent's arguments that the
rules violate the appropriation provision of the Colorado Constitution
must fail unless the confined aquifer contains unappropriated waters.
However, the water court found that the waters in both the confined
and the unconfined aquifers are overappropriated.
Opponent asserts that the correct measure of whether water is
available for new appropriation is whether its use causes material injury

Issue 2

ARTICLE UPDATE

to a senior vested right. This argument does not support overturning
the water court's ruling, however, because the water court found that
new or increased withdrawals from the confined aquifer system will
cause material injury to existing water rights. Consequently, the
artesian pressure requirements in SB 04-222 and those in the rules do
not violate the constitutional right to divert unappropriated waters
because the waters in the confined aquifer are not unappropriated, and
thus are not subject to that right.
In addition, the provision in SB 04-222 withstands scrutiny because
it has several rational bases. As the water court noted, the artesian
pressure requirements help to protect vested water rights, maintain a
sustainable water supply in the confined aquifer, and prevent
underground water use from interfering with the state's ability to fulfill
its obligations under the Rio Grande Compact. The provisions in the
rules are based on the legislative mandate from SB 04-222, and are valid
as such.
B. One-for-One Replacement Requirement is Valid
Opponent similarly contests the requirement in Rule 6.B.2 that will
frequently have the effect of requiring an applicant for. a new
withdrawal from the confined aquifer to make a one-for-one
replacement of that withdrawal. Opponent assumes that the water
court's finding that the water is being "mined' is the "linchpin" for Rule
6.B.2, but this assumption is misplaced.
The basis for Opponent's challenge to Rule 6.B.2 is its assertion that
the rule violates the right to appropriate. However, as discussed above,
the provision cannot violate the constitutional right to divert
unappropriated waters because there are currently no unappropriated
waters in the confined aquifer. Consequently, while we are not
convinced by Opponent's assertion that the water court's finding of
mining is unsupported by the record, we need not reach that issue.
C. Nonirrigated Native Vegetation
Opponent also argues that the rules related to nonirrigated native
vegetation must be invalidated. Specifically, Opponent objects to the
rules' use of the phrase, 'unappropriated water is not made available
and injury is not prevented as a result of the reduction of water
consumption by nonirrigated native vegetation.' See Rule 6.A.2, 6.B.7.
In support of its argument that the specified language should not be
included in the rules, it notes that SB 04-222 does not contain the
phrase quoted above. However, the statutory authority for the phrase is
found in HB 98-1011, which uses the quoted language three times. See
§ 37-90-137(a); § 37-90-137(12)(b)(I) (repealed 2004); § 37-92305(6) (c). Because the rules mirror statutory law, they do not exceed
the scope of the statutory authority.
Because we find that there is a statutory basis for the rules,
Opponent's other arguments regarding the treatment of nonirrigated
native vegetation are best treated as attacks on the validity of the

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 13

statutory provisions. We hold that there is a rational basis for those
provisions. For example, the provisions may represent an attempt by
the legislature to balance the potential environmental consequences of
encouraging eradication of phreatophytes against the potential benefits
of salvaging water that would have been used by them.The question of
whether to encourage such changed conditions in order to permit
increased water use is 'fraught with important public policy
considerations.' Thus, the legislature properly exercised its authority by
resolving that issue.
D. Finding of Injury is Permissible
Citing Alamosa-a Jara, Opponent asserts that the rules
impermissibly create an irrebuttable finding of injury in every instance
of a new withdrawal. In Alamosa-ILa Iara, we held that provisions of
rules that presumed 'that each underground water diversion materially
injures senior appropriators' were permissible. In so holding, however,
we noted that the rules allowed individuals to "retain the right in 'each
case' to challenge the application of the aquifer-wide determination of
material injury to 'each diversion."' Opponent notes that Rule 5.F
states that new withdrawals of groundwater that will affect the rate or
direction of movement of water in the confined aquifer will cause
material injury and therefore must be properly augmented. Therefore,
Opponent argues that the rules eliminate any possibility of showing that
a particular diversion will not in fact cause injury to vested water rights.
In fact, the rules are based on a finding of fact that a new
withdrawal of groundwater from the confined aquifer will cause injury
unless it is properly augmented. Rule 5.F. This finding provides the
basis for a requirement that any new withdrawal must prevent injury to
senior water rights. See Rule 6.B. Because the confined aquifer is
overappropriated all the time, the only way to prevent injury to senior
rights would be to require full replacement.
We also note that the rules provide an opportunity to rebut the
presumption that the RGDSS model accurately determines the amount,
time, and location of depletions and fluctuations in artesian pressure
that would be caused by a new withdrawal. Rule 6.B.6. If an applicant
for a new withdrawal successfully presents evidence that demonstrates
that the withdrawal would not impact artesian pressures, the rules leave
open the possibility that the applicant would be permitted to withdraw
new water.
E. The Rules Are Not Invalid Because They Fail to Regulate
Existing Users
The rules at issue regulate only new withdrawals from the confined
aquifer. Opponent argues that by failing to regulate existing wells, the
state engineer is abdicating his responsibility. To the extent that
Opponent argues that the rules must fail because they regulate only
new withdrawals, and fail to also regulate existing users, we reject their
argument.
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Opponent does not cite any statutory provisions that could be
construed as requiring the rules to regulate both existing and new water
users of the confined aquifer. Indeed, SB 04-222 gives the state
engineer 'wide discretion to permit the continued use of underground
water consistent with preventing material injury to senior surface water
rights.' § 37-92-501(4)(a). In addition, we note that nothing in the
rules precludes further regulation of existing wells. Thus, we find that
the rules do not violate statutory authority by regulating only new water
uses.
F. HB 98-1011, SB 04-222, and the Rules Do Not Violate
Equal Protection
Similarly, Opponent argues that the rules violate equal protection
because they regulate new diversions without regulating existing
diversions, and because they regulate withdrawals from the confined
aquifer but not withdrawals from the unconfined aquifer. To the
extent that these distinctions are required by HB 98-1011 and
SB 04-222, they argue that those statutes similarly violate equal
protection.
In order to succeed in showing that equal protection was denied,
Opponent is required to show that the classification at issue 'lacks a
legitimate governmental purpose and, without a rational basis,
arbitrarily singles out a group of persons for disparate treatment in
comparison to other persons who are similarly situated.' In addition,
'[i]f any conceivable set of facts would lead to the conclusion that a
classification serves a legitimate purpose, a court must assume those
facts exist.' Because a rational basis exists for treating the groups at
issue here differently, Opponent's argument fails.
First, there is a rational basis for treating those who would make
new withdrawals from the unconfined aquifer differently from those
who would make new withdrawals from the confined aquifer. While the
confined and unconfined aquifers are hydraulically connected, they are
separate systems with different characteristics. For instance, as the water
court notes, the confined aquifer is under artesian pressure while the
unconfined aquifer is not, and there is substantial evidence as to the
negative effects of decreasing artesian pressure. Therefore, it would be
rational to conclude that the issues facing regulation of the confined
aquifer are acute and different from the issues facing regulation of the
unconfined aquifer.
In addition, there is a rational basis to distinguish between those
who currently have the right to withdraw water from the confined
aquifer and others who have not yet obtained a water right. There are
fewer, if any, due process issues with regulating potential water users
who do not have any existing water rights as compared with those who
have perfected a water right by actual beneficial use. Therefore, a
rational basis exists for the distinction, and it does not violate equal
protection.
Id. at 261-64 (case citations omitted).
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Archuleta v. Gomez
"In addition to standing for the proposition that an adverse
possession claimant must demonstrate actual beneficial use of the
deeded owner's water right, our cases establish that no person can
revive or adversely possess an abandoned water right. Thus, adverse
possession cases should address whether the deeded owner abandoned
the water right. If the right has been abandoned, the water belonging
to it for beneficial use reverts to the stream, and the right cannot be
revived through adverse possession.
Instead, the adverse possession claimant must show that the
adjudicated irrigation water right at issue was continuously put to
beneficial use on lands irrigated by the claimant, rather than the
deeded owner, during the statutory period. Section 37-92402 (10),
C.R.S. (2008), of Colorado's 1969 Water Right Adjudication and
Administration Act provides that ten or more years of non-use of a
water right by the person entitled to use the right creates a rebuttable
presumption of abandonment to the stream of the right, or that part of
the right, which has not been exercised. Abandonment is defined as
'the termination of a water right in wholerinpart as a result of the
intent of the owner thereof to discontinue permanently the use of all or
part of the water available thereunder.'
§ 37-92-103(2), C.RS. (2008) (emphasis added).

A presumption of abandonment requires the concurrence of two
elements: non-use for the statutory period (ten years) and the intent to
abandon. This presumption may be rebutted by evidence of the
owner's intent not to abandon the right; evidence rebutting the
presumption of abandonment may include such acts as loaning or
leasing the water to others or good faith efforts to sell the water right.
Abandonment of a water right may occur in whole or in part; the
amount of water abandoned reverts to the stream, to the benefit of
other rights in order of their adjudicated priority. Evidence rebutting
the presumption of abandonment may also be adduced by an adverse
possession claimant who demonstrates his or her continuous use of the
deeded owner's interest in the adjudicated water right."
Archuleta v. Gomez, 200 P.3d 333, 344 (Colo. 2009).

'We summarize our precedent applicable to the 'actual' use
element of adverse possession in an irrigation water rights case.
Because actual beneficial use is the basis, measure, and extent of an
appropriative water right for irrigation in Colorado, an adverse
possession claimant to an irrigation water right has the burden to
establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, the amount of water
expressed in acre feet belonging to the deeded owner's water right that
the adverse claimant has placed to beneficial consumptive use.
Quantification proof is essential because the effect of a successful
adverse possession claim is to transfer, in whole or in part, the
ownership of the irrigation water right's beneficial consumptive use

Issue 2

ARTICLE UPDATE

entitlement, under its adjudicated priority, from the deeded owner to
the adverse claimant.
Water that an adverse possession claimant has intercepted in the
ditch from the deeded owner's interest in the adjudicated irrigation
water right, but which has not been beneficially consumed by either the
claimant or the deeded owner, presumably has returned to the tributary
aquifer or the surface stream. Mere diversion of water cannot be
counted as an actual beneficial use upon which adverse possession can
be founded because 'to make [a diversion of water into a constitutional
appropriation] it must be... actually applied to the land.' In addition,
return flow water belongs to the stream as part of the public's water
resource for use by others in order of their decreed priorities."
Id. at 346 (citations omitted).

North Sterling Irrigation District v. Simpson
"The General Assembly has charged the state engineer and division
engineers with administering, distributing, and regulating the waters of
the state. § 37-92-501 (1), C.1S. (2008). Water officials must distribute
water according to the order of priority as fixed by judicial
decrees.Direct flow water rights and storage water rights are entitled to
administration based on their priority, regardless of the type of
beneficial use fof which the appropriation was made. The state
engineer is authorized to adopt rules and regulations to assist in, but
not as a prerequisite to, the fulfillment of these duties. § 37-92-501 (1).
The state and division engineers are also authorized to curtail diversions
that contravene applicable law. § 37-92-502, C.1RS. (2008).
One such applicable law is the 'one-fill' limitation on water storage
rights. Colorado law dictates that a reservoir is limited to one annual
filling, according to its decreed capacity. Where a decree expressly
addresses how diversions are to be accounted for under the one-fill
rule, the water officials must administer the storage right pursuant to
the decree. However, where, as here, storage decrees are silent on the
issue, the state engineer and division engineers are bound by their
statutory mandate to account for, and if necessary, curtail diversions
that violate the one-fill rule.
On the basis of the foregoing, the water court held that the
Engineers are vested with the authority to institute a fixed water year in
order to fulfill their statutory function of administering NSID's storage
rights pursuant to law. According to the court, by instituting a fixed
water year beginning November 1, the Engineers are able to keep track
of how much water has been diverted during a one-year period. Once
the holder of a water storage right has filled its right once, the right is
satisfied and the Engineers can refuse to honor a call during the
remainder of that one-year period. The court concluded that such
fixed-year administration was necessary to protect against the
enlargement of NSID's storage rights beyond its one fill in a given
year."
"Because NSID's rights have historically been administered
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consistent with a fixed water year, NSID has not demonstrated any legal
injury associated with a change in administrative policy. In any event,
such a claim of injury would not be cognizable, as NSID's decrees do
not address how diversions are to be accounted for under the one-fill
Where storage decrees are silent with respect to the
rule.
administration of the one-fill rule, the Engineers have authority under
sections 37-92-501 and 502 to determine how to administer Colorado's
one-fill mandate. 'In times of short supply, water users depend on the
Engineers to curtail undecreed uses and decreed junior uses in favor of
decreed senior uses.' Here, the Engineers have implemented a fixed
water year in order to prevent the undecreed use of water in excess of
the one-fill rule and thereby attain the security of other adjudicated
water rights. This action is within the authority conferred upon them
by law."
North Sterling Irrigation Dist. V. Simpson, 202 P.3d 1207, 1210-11 (Colo. 2009)
(citations omitted).

Cornelius v. River Ridge Ranch Landowners Association (No.
08SA83, March 2, 2009)
Cornelius failed to
"Here, there was extensive nondisclosure.
provide any initial disclosures required by Rule 26(a), although he was
notified several times of the need to do so. Rule 26(a) disclosures begin
the discovery process and provide parties with a starting point for
gathering information about the case. Under Rule 26(a), among other
things, parties must disclose the names and addresses of individuals with
discoverable information; copies of, or a description by category and
location of all documents and tangible things in each party's possession
relevant to the case; and the identity of any person who may testify as an
expert at trial. With the information provided by Rule 26(a)
disclosures, parties may make specific requests for information or
clarification of disclosed information.
Cornelius's applications required precise information about senior
appropriations in the basin, whether his proposed diversion would
harm senior water rights, and the replacement of source water resulting
The applications
from his proposed out-of-priority diversions.
contained only general categories stating the proposed beneficial use of
the water - domestic, commercial, and livestock - and did not identify
end users or the particular manner in which the water would be used.
Because the Arkansas and Cucharas Rivers are overappropriated,
Cornelius's proposed plan for augmentation was crucial. However,
Cornelius only proposed to augment one of the thirty wells from which
he was seeking to appropriate. Accordingly, as a threshold matter,
Cornelius would need to demonstrate his proposed diversions would
not harm senior rights - a difficult task in an overappropriated basin
when not relying on an augmentation plan. Further, Cornelius's
proposed single well augmentation plan provided almost no detail with
regard to the manner in which it would operate. It simply stated the
well in question would 'be engaged and piped to the Cucharas River in
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an adequate amount to augment the water consumed."
Cornelius v. River Ridge Ranch Landowner Ass'n, 202 P.3d 564, 570 (Colo. 2009) (case
citations omitted).

"Cornelius argues that, if it was not error to dismiss the cases, it was
nonetheless improper for the trial court to dismiss the cases with
prejudice. He contends dismissal with prejudice was improper for two
reasons: (1) the Opposers could have mitigated any harm caused by his
delay in prosecution through filing a motion to compel or
interrogatories; and (2) Cornelius is now likely to comply with the
disclosure requirements because he is represented by counsel.
Cornelius did not present this argument to the water court, and raises it
for the first time on appeal.
Cornelius's argument does not change our analysis of whether
dismissal was proper. A trial court retains the discretion to dismiss an
action with or without prejudice. C.1C.P. 41 (b). After balancing the
unreasonableness of the delay with the proffered mitigating
circumstances, dismissal with prejudice may be appropriate if the
defendants are harmed as a result of the plaintiffs failure to prosecute.
As we stated above, the Opposers were harmed as a result of Cornelius's
delay, and Cornelius's proffered mitigating circumstances do not
outweigh the unreasonableness of that delay.
Cornelius's argument that the Opposers could have mitigated harm
through filing a motion to compel or interrogatories is unpersuasive
because, as discussed above, it is the plaintiffs duty to prosecute a case.
Cornelius's argument that he is now likely to comply with the disclosure
requirements similarly fails. The simple fact that, given a second
chance, a plaintiff would prosecute a case more diligently does not
excuse an initial failure to prosecute or mean that a case should not be
dismissed with prejudice.
Cornelius has presented no case law
suggesting the contrary. Rather, he again argues that because he was
previously not represented by counsel, he did not know of his disclosure
obligations. As discussed above, pro se parties are held to the same
rules as parties represented by counsel.
We conclude that the water court did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing with prejudice Cornelius's applications for appropriation of
water rights and plan for augmentation.
Cornelius's large-scale
nondisclosure and failure to provide the Opposers and water court with
any information about his applications other than that contained in his
initial applications constituted a failure to prosecute. The Opposers
were prejudiced by this delay and Cornelius has failed to provide any
mitigating reasons to account for the delay."
Id. at 572-73. (case citations omitted).

